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There is an ongoing debate in the U.S. among policymakers and the courts concerning the 
practical effects of state investment tax incentives.  However, this debate often suffers from a 
lack of clear information on the extent of such incentives among states and how these incentives 
have evolved over time.  This paper takes a first step toward addressing this shortcoming.  
Compiling information from all fifty states and the District of Columbia over the past 40 years, 
we are able to paint a picture of the variation in state investment tax incentives across states and 
over time.  In particular, we document 3 stylized facts:  (1) Over the last forty years, state 
investment tax incentives have become increasingly large and increasingly common among 
states; (2) These incentives, as well as the level of the overall after-tax price of capital, are to a 
large extent clustered in certain regions of the country; and (3) States that enact investment tax 
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State Investment Tax Incentives:  What are the Facts? 
 
1.  Introduction 
  In the late 1990s, the automaker DaimlerChrysler faced a major decision – expand and 
upgrade its existing Jeep assembly plant in Toledo, Ohio or replace it with a new plant located 
elsewhere.  In order to keep DaimlerChrysler’s Jeep production in Toledo and in Ohio, state and 
city officials in 1998 put together a package of tax incentives for the company valued at $280 
million.  The package consisted of a newly-enacted local property tax exemption exclusively for 
the Jeep facility and an existing investment tax credit against the state corporate income tax.  
Though it is not widely acknowledged, the investment tax credit, in fact, already was on the 
books since 1995 and was not a tax measure passed specifically for DaimlerChrysler (or any 
other single company). 
  This tax incentive package led to a legal challenge, Cuno, et al. v. DaimlerChrysler, et 
al., against Toledo, Ohio, and DaimlerChrysler.  The case eventually made its way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2005-2006 after the Sixth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals ruled that Ohio’s 
investment tax credit ran afoul of the so-called dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  (Note this case is discussed in much greater detail in Enrich (2006, NTA 
proceedings) and in Stark and Wilson (2005)).  The “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause 
is a doctrine inferred by the U.S. Supreme Court from the Commerce Clause (clause 3) in Article 
I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which empowers the U.S. Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce.  The inference is that, because the Commerce Clause explicitly grants the U.S. 
Congress the power to enact legislation pertaining to interstate commerce, the Constitution   3
implicitly bars states and localities from doing so.  For whatever reason, the Supreme Court 
traditionally has restricted its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to tax statutes.   
 In  the  Cuno case, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that, since a tax credit is no different than an 
income tax (with a negative rate)  and thus Ohio’s ITC effectively taxes an Ohio-sited company 
differently depending on whether it chooses to invest in-state or out-of-state, the credit violates 
the dormant Commerce Clause. 
  The Supreme Court agreed to hear this case in 2006.  However, it did not address the 
merits of the case but instead ruled that the plaintiffs did not have standing in federal court – i.e., 
the plaintiffs should have initiated the case in state court rather than federal court.  Thus, the 
constitutionality of state investment tax credits remains very much an open question.  While the 
Cuno case itself is headed back to state court in Ohio, a number of other, similar cases are 
currently before the courts in other parts of the U.S.. 
  Of central importance to the legal debate is whether such tax credits and other statewide 
tax incentives do, in fact, adversely impact out-of-state economic activity.  For instance, in the 
Supreme Court case Bacchus Imports v. Dias, the majority wrote that a tax provision violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause if the provision  “will in its practical operation work discrimination 
against interstate commerce,..., by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business” 
(Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 1984) (italics added).
1 
Of course, the in-state and out-of-state impacts of tax incentives are not only important to 
the courts, but also is of central importance to   policymakers.  State policymakers are guided by 
                                                 
1 Curiously, the case law on the dormant Commerce Clause is limited to considerations of the validity of taxes, 
credits, or exemptions on specific, targeted activities, but never has addressed the issue of whether the corporate 
income tax itself violates the clause.  This point was noted in Stark and Wilson (2005):  “There has never been any 
suggestion in Cuno or elsewhere that a state choosing to lower its overall business tax burden would face any 
Commerce Clause restraints in choosing to do so, even if such a policy change would lead businesses to relocate 
from one state to another.”    4
economic studies as to the effectiveness of these incentives in stimulating economic activity 
within their state and whether their state faces economic harm from tax incentives enacted in 
other states.  National policymakers also are keenly interested in knowing the in-state and out-of-
state costs and benefits of these tax incentives.  For instance, in the last several years, there have 
been a number of bills proposed in Congress that would affect the ability of states to enact these 
incentives.  Unfortunately, though, there has been very little economic research into the in-state 
vs. out-of-state effects of state tax incentives.  The primary reason, we believe, is a lack of data, 
both on economic activity and on state tax policy.  
This paper takes a first step toward addressing this shortcoming by investigating the 
nature of the variation in state investment tax incentives.  Compiling information from all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia over the past 40 years, we are able to paint a picture of the 
variation in state investment tax incentives across states and over time.  Specifically, we 
document 3 facts: 
1.  Over the last forty years, state investment tax incentives have become increasingly large 
and increasingly common among states,  
2.  These incentives, as well as the level of the overall after-tax price of capital, are to a large 
extent clustered in certain regions of the country 
3.  States that enact investment tax credits tend to do so around the same time as their 
neighboring states. 
 
  Before proceeding with our investigation of state tax incentives, it is important that we be 
clear as to the scope of our investigation.  We focus here on general, statewide investment tax 
incentives such as increases in investment tax credits (ITCs) or reductions in the corporate   5
income tax.  We abstract from narrowly targeted state incentives such as those targeted toward 
particular localities (e.g., “enterprise zones”) or specific industries because such incentives have 
little impact on the overall business tax climate for a state as a whole. Given our focus on 
investment incentives, we also exclude from our analysis tax incentives targeted solely at job 
creation; approximately 20 states have a general, statewide job creation tax credit in 2004. 
Lastly, we ignore tax incentives targeted at specific companies, such as those aimed at landing 
high-profile plants of foreign automakers.
2  While these plant-specific incentives receive much 
press attention, the investment they potentially elicit is, quantitatively, at most a very small share 
of statewide investment.  For example, the largest investment in recent years associated solely 
with targeted tax incentives that we are aware of is the $550 million plant that Honda reportedly 
will begin building in 2006 in Greensburg, Indiana.  While this investment may seem large, it is 
actually rather quite small relative to the $5.2 billion of investment done by manufacturers in 
Indiana in the most recent year of available data (2004, Annual Survey of Manufacturers) and 
given that $550 million will be spread out over several years. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data we have 
constructed on state investment tax incentives from 1964 – 2004.  A detailed description of the 
cross-state and cross-time variation in these incentives is presented in Section 3.  Section 4 
concludes.   
                                                 
2 Note the Ohio ITC at issue in the Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler case does not fit in this category because, as mentioned 
above, the ITC is available to all businesses with qualified investment in Ohio.   6
 
2.  Data 
The focus of this paper is on state tax policy related to business investment.  
Conceptually, we want to capture the elements of state tax policy that affect the after-tax price of 
capital faced by a business in a given state.  The Neoclassical formulation of the after-tax price 
of capital, often referred to as the user cost of capital, was introduced by Hall and Jorgenson 
(1967) and has been further developed and expanded upon by, among others, King and Fullerton 
(1984), Gravelle (1994), and Jorgenson and Yun (2001).  The basic formula for the user cost of 
capital for state s at time t is as follows,  
 
   s,t t t s,t UC PRICE *OPPCOST *TAX = .    
 
This series is defined as the product of three terms.  The first term ( t PRICE ) is the 
purchase price of a capital good relative to the price of output.  The second term ( t OPPCOST ) is 
the opportunity cost of holding depreciating capital.
3  The third term ( s,t TAX ), which we will 
refer to as the “tax wedge,” captures the corporate income tax rate as well as the value of tax 
credits and deductions.  Notice that the tax wedge is the ratio of the after-tax price of capital 
( tt s , t PRICE *OPPCOST *TAX ) and pre-tax price of capital ( tt PRICE *OPPCOST ).  The tax 
wedge essentially serves as a summary statistic of the extent of taxation imposed on capital in a 
given state and hence is our primary variable of interest.  Following Hall and Jorgenson (1967) 
and others, we define the tax wedge as follows, 
                                                 
3 The opportunity cost of capital depends on the state income tax rate because of the tax-deductibility of interest 
payments.  This state-dependent feature of the tax code has a small effect on the opportunity cost, and hence the s 
subscript has been omitted.     7
 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S F E,S E,F E,S E,F
s,t s,t t t s,t s,t s,t s,t TAX 1 ITC ITC TD 1 =− − − τ + τ − τ + τ  ,  (1) 
where  S
s,t ITC  and  F
t ITC  are the legislated investment tax credit rates at the state and federal 
levels, respectively,  E,S
s,t τ  and  E,F
t τ  are the effective corporate income tax rates at the state and 
federal levels, respectively,  t TD  is the present value of tax depreciation allowances.  (In the 
current, preliminary draft of this paper, TDt is simply set equal to a constant of 0.7.) 
  We measure the components of the tax wedge using a variety of data sources.  The state 
investment tax credit rates,  S
s,t ITC  were obtained directly from states’ online corporate tax forms 
and instructions.  For most states with an investment tax credit, both current and historical credit 
rates are provided in the current year instructions (since companies applying for a credit based on 
some past year’s investment apply that year’s credit rate rather than the current rate).  In those 
few cases where some or all historical rates were missing from the online forms and instructions, 
the missing rates are obtained via direct communication with the state’s department of taxation.  
In some states, the legislated investment tax credit rate varies by the level of capital 
expenditures; we use the legislated credit rate for the highest tier of capital expenditures.  
  The effective corporate income tax rate at the state level,  E,S
s,t τ , is lower than the 
legislated (or statutory) corporate income tax rate , L,S
s,t τ , due to the deductibility (in some states) 
against state taxable income of taxes paid to the federal government.
4  Some states allow full 
deductibility of federal corporate income taxes from state taxable income, Iowa and Missouri 
allow only 50% deductibility, and some states allow no deductibility at all.  The deductibility 
                                                 
4 Some states refer to their corporate income taxes as "franchise" or "excise" taxes.     8
provision in state tax codes is represented by  s,t {1.0,0.5,0.0} υ = , and the provisional effective 
corporate income tax rate at the state level is as follows, 
 
   #,E,S L,S #,E,F
s,t s,t t s,t (1 ) τ= τ− τ υ . 
 
The effect of federal income tax deducibility is represented by the provisional effective corporate 
income tax rate at the federal level (defined below).  
 The  L,S
s,t s,t and τυ  series are obtained from several sources.  For recent years, data are 
obtained primarily from various issues of Book of the States (Council of State Governments) and 
State Tax Handbook (Commerce Clearing House), as well as actual state tax forms.  Data for 
earlier years are obtained from various issues of Book of the States and Significant Features of 
Fiscal Federalism (American Council on Intergovernmental Affairs).  Additional information has 
been provided by the Tax Foundation website (see Tax Foundation in References).  Many states 
have multiple legislated tax rates that increase stepwise with taxable income; we measure  L,S
t,s τ  
with the marginal legislated tax rate for the highest income bracket. 
  Similarly, the effective corporate income tax rate at the federal level is lower than the 
legislated corporate income tax rate ( L,F
t,s τ ) due to the deductibility against federal taxable 
income of taxes paid to the state.  The provisional effective corporate income tax rate at the 
federal level is as follows, 
 
   #,E,F L,F #,E,S
s,t t s,t (1 ) τ= τ− τ    9
 
  It has not generally been recognized that, owing to deductibility of taxes paid to another 
level of government, the effective corporate income tax rates at the state and federal levels are 
functionally related to each other.  As shown in the above equations, these interrelationships 
yield two equations in two unknowns and thus can be solved for the effective corporate income 
tax rates at the state and federal levels, respectively, as follows, 
 
   E,S L,S L,F L,S L,F
s,t s,t s,t s,t t s,t t 11 ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ τ= τ − υ τ − υ τ τ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , 
   E,F L,F L,S L,S L,F
s,t s,t t s,t s,t t 11 ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ τ= τ − τ − υ τ τ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
The overall corporate income tax rate is the sum of  E,S E,F
s,t s,t and τ τ .  In the limiting case where 
federal corporate income taxes are not deductible against state taxable income ( s,t 0 υ= ), this 
sum reduces to the more frequently used formula,  L,S L,F L,S L,F
s,t t s,t t * τ +τ −τ τ . 
  There are three caveats on the data that should be noted.  First, local property taxes also 
affect the true after-tax price of capital and hence the state tax wedge.  However, we do not 
consider these taxes in this paper both for data availability reasons and because states in general 
do not directly control local tax policy.  Hence excluding property taxes provides a better picture 
of state-controlled tax policy.  Second, we do not account for state differences in the 
apportionment formulae used to allocate a business’s federal taxable income among states. 
Properly incorporating a state’s apportionment formula into the after-tax price of capital requires 
information that is not available such as the geographic distribution of property, payroll, and 
sales for businesses operating in the state.  Third, we purge our state tax wedge variable of the   10
effect of federal tax policies, such as the federal investment tax credit, which existed from 1962 
to 1986, and the federal corporate income tax, since our focus in this paper is on the cross-state 
and cross-time variation in state tax policies.  Including federal tax components, while having 
little effect on between-state comparisons
5, would dominate the time series movements in the 
state tax wedge and hence obscure the trends in state tax policy over time.  Specifically, we set 
F
t ITC  = 0 and  E,F
s,t τ  = 0 in equation (1) above.  Imposing these restrictions yields the following 
formula for the state tax wedge ,  
 
  () ( )
SE , S E , S
s,t s,t t s,t s,t TAX 1 ITC TD 1 =− − τ − τ                   (2) 
 
3.  Some Stylized Facts About State Investment Tax Policy Over The Past 40 Years 
  As described in the previous section, the tax ramifications of capital investment by 
businesses in a particular state, as summarized by our state tax wedge measure, are driven 
primarily by the rates of the corporate income tax and the investment tax credit (if one has been 
enacted) in the state.  In this section, we analyze how state investment tax policies have changed 
over the past 40 years, both in terms of overall or average investment-related taxation, as well as 
in terms of the geographic distribution of such taxation. 
 
                                                 
5 The effect of federal tax policy on cross-state variation in the true after-tax price of capital likely is very small, but 
it is not literally zero because federal tax parameters interact with state tax parameters in the formula for the after-tax 
price.  For example, the “effective” state corporate tax rate may be a function of the federal tax rate if the state 
allows for the deductibility of federal taxes from state taxable income.   11
A.  Growth Over Time 
  State level tax policy concerning business investment has been far from stable over the 
past forty years.  The most obvious evidence of this movement is the rise in the number of states 
offering investment tax credits.  This rise is shown in Figure 1 (see the bars).  In 1969, New York 
became the first state to enact an investment tax credit (ITC). 21 additional states have since 
enacted their own, though two states (California and Maine) later repealed their credit.
6  In 
addition to the rising number of states offering credits, the average size (rate) of the credits, 
among those states that offer one, also has increased dramatically (see the line in Figure 1).  The 
average credit rate rose from 1% in the early 1970s to about 4% in the 2000s.   
  Figure 2 shows the combined effect of the rising adoption of ITCs and the increasing rate 
among adopters.  Specifically, the red-gray solid line in the figure shows the overall average ITC 
rate (i.e., the average including the zeros of the non-ITC states).  The overall average increased 
steadily but slowly from 1968 to 1993, then increased rapidly in the late 1990s before flattening 
out in the 2000s. 
  The other main state tax parameter affecting business investment is the corporate income 
tax rate.  We focus here on the top marginal tax rate – i.e., the rate relevant for the largest 
businesses – since large businesses tend to account for the bulk of investment in the U.S.   The 
average top marginal corporate income tax rate among states, from 1964-2004, is shown in 
Figure 2 (dotted line).  The average tax rate rose steeply from 1964 to 1972 – in large part 
because a number of states first adopted a corporate income tax during this period – then rose 
relatively slowly until 1991, and has since declined slowly but steadily. 
                                                 
6 As noted earlier, we are including here only general, state-wide ITCs.  ITCs eligible only on investment in limited 
geographic areas (e.g., “enterprise zones”), in specific industries, or for specific firms are excluded.   12
  As discussed in the previous section, the combined effect of state corporate income taxes 
and state ITCs can be assessed by the state tax wedge – the ratio of the after-tax price of capital 
(excluding federal and property tax components) and the pre-tax price of capital.  A tax wedge of 
1 represents neutral tax policy with respect to investment.  Values above 1 imply tax 
disincentives to investment, while values below 1 imply tax subsidies.  The average state tax 
wedge over our sample period is shown in the solid black line in Figure 2.  For the purposes of 
display, we subtract one from the average state tax wedge in order to fit it on the same axis as the 
ITC rate.  For example, a value of 1% translates into a state tax wedge value of 1.01.  The time 
series movement of the state tax wedge essentially can be characterized by three episodes.  From 
1964 to 1972, the average state tax wedge increased from 1.011 to 1.018.  This increase was 
almost entirely due to the increase in the average corporate income tax over this period.  From 
1973 to 1993, the average tax wedge was roughly constant at around 1.017.  This constancy was 
the result of a steadily increasing average corporate income tax rate being offset by a steadily 
increasing ITC rate.  Finally, from 1994 to 2004, the average tax wedge dropped precipitously to 
just 1.006.  As the figure clearly shows, this drop was the result of a large increase in the average 
ITC rate, which more than offset the slight decline in corporate tax rates during this period. 
  The averages shown in Figure 2 are unweighted.  It is informative also to consider how 
the time series movements in average ITC rate, corporate tax rate, and state tax wedge change if 
one weights states by the size of their economies.  This may give a sense of the aggregate impact 
of state tax policy changes of special interest to national policymakers.  Figure 3 shows the 
results of weighting by Gross State Product (from the BEA), which is available only from 1977 
onward.  The weighted series display the same basic patterns as the unweighted series except that 
the weighted-average ITC rate increases, and the weighted-average tax wedge decreases, much   13
more rapidly after 1993 than indicated by the unweighted series.  Also, weighting by GSP yields 
a large drop in the ITC series and a large spike in the tax wedge series in 2004.  Both the post-
1993 and the 2004 changes are almost entirely explained by tax policy changes in California, 
whose GSP hovers between 12% and 14% of nationwide GSP during the sample period. 
California enacted a 6% ITC in 1994; this credit was repealed in 2004.   
  Whether or not one weights states by economic activity, it is clear that state taxation of 
business investment has declined considerably since at least the late 1970s and the decline has 
been primarily concentrated in the last ten years.  It should be noted that our finding that the state 
taxation of business investment has fallen over the last few decades is consistent with the well-
known fall in state corporate tax revenues relative to business income (profits) since the early 
1980s (see Fisher (2002) and Wilson (2006)).  Our results suggest that state investment tax 
credits may play a large role in explaining this fall, though changes in the ability of businesses to 
shield income from reported taxable income also is likely to have been a major contributor 
(Cornia, Edmiston, Sjoquist, and Wallace (2005)). 
 
B.  The Current Clustering of State Investment Tax Incentives Among States 
  In the preceding section, we discussed how the average or overall taxation of business 
investment done by states has changed over the last forty years.  We now turn to an investigation 
of how this taxation varies among states in 2004.  
    We begin by considering the geographic variation in state investment tax credits.  Figure 
4 displays a series of four maps, one for each year 1968, 1975, 1986, and 2004.  In each map, 
states are shaded according to their ITC rate.  States with no ITC are left white, other states are   14
shaded according to where their ITC rate fits within four (exhaustive) categories, with darker 
shading indicating higher credit rates.   
  Focusing only on the 2004 map in the upper left part of Figure 4, we see a rather stark 
geographic clustering of ITCs.  Aside from those in Idaho and Hawaii, ITCs essentially are 
clustered into four regions of the country – the Central Midwest, the Southeast, the Northeast, 
and the Rust Belt region of Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia.   
  So state investment tax credits clearly are geographically clustered, but what about the 
general investment tax policy imposed by states?  Figure 5 shows maps for the state tax wedge 
analogous to the ITC maps in Figure 4.  States are shaded according to which of five, fixed 
categories describes their tax wedge .  Darker shading indicates a lower state tax wedge, i.e., 
state tax policy more favorable to investment.  States in white actually have a tax wedge less than 
or equal to one, meaning that the after-tax price of capital is equal to or less than the pre-tax 
price.  Tax wedge less than one (i.e., a subsidy) can occur if a state has an ITC along with a zero 
or very low corporate tax rate. 
  Again, we focus for now just on the 2004 map in Figure 5.  There appears to be 
considerable clustering in 2004.  Roughly speaking, there are primarily three clusters of 
comparatively low state tax wedges:  The Northern Plains states of Iowa, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming; the lower Northeast; and the Southeast.  More formally, we note that the 
correlation, in 2004, between a state’s tax wedge and the average tax wedge among its bordering 
states (“neighbors”) is 0.24 (p < 0.1).   15
C.  Clustering Among States in Changes to State Investment Tax Incentives 
  In the preceding two subsections, we showed that state investment tax incentives have 
increased over time and that, as of 2004, state investment tax incentives were clustered in certain 
regions of the country.  Here we ask whether the timing of changes in state investment tax 
incentives tends to be geographically clustered. 
  First, we assess the extent of clustering in the enactment of state ITCs at four points in 
time.  Given the relatively small number of observations of ITC enactment to date (22), it is 
difficult to statistically test whether, in a given year, the probability of a state enacting an ITC is 
related to whether its neighboring states have recently adopted an ITC.  However, such clustering 
clearly is suggested by comparing the year maps in Figure 4.  The enactment of ITCs by states 
over the last forty years can be characterized, loosely, by four “episodes”:  adoption in the 
Northeast between 1969 and 1975, adoption in the Central Midwest between 1975 and 1986, 
adoption in the Rust Belt between 1995 and 2003, and adoption in the Southeast in the single 
two-year period of 1995-96.  This regional clustering of ITC enactment certainly is suggestive of 
tax competition among neighboring states, though it is by no means proof of tax competition.  It 
alternatively could be explained by states responding independently to state-specific economic 
shocks, which happen to be spatially correlated.    16
   Changes in state investment tax policy, more generally, as reflected in changes in the 
state tax wedge, also appear to be clustered geographically.  This clustering can be seen by 
comparing the four maps in Figure 5.  It is particularly apparent for the Southeast and the 
Northeast.  For instance, the southeast states of Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia all had tax wedges in the middle category, 1.015 to 1.02, from 1968 to 
1986; by 2004, three of these states had reduced their tax wedge below 1.015.  Clustering also is 
illustrated well by the changes in tax wedge in the northeast.  The lower northeast states of New 
York, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut each had tax wedges in the upper 
half of the distribution in 1968, while the uppermost northeast states of Maine and New 
Hampshire had tax wedges in the lowest category.  By 2004, the reverse was true:  the lower 
northeast states were all in the lowest category of tax wedge, while the uppermost states were in 
the top two categories. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
    This paper investigated how tax policy at the state level with regard to investment varies 
across states and over time.  We developed a framework for measuring state taxation of 
investment useful for cross-state and cross-time comparisons and compiled data on such taxation 
for each state plus the District of Columbia from 1964 to 2004.  Figures 1, 2, and 3 documented 
that state investment tax incentives have grown dramatically over the last forty years.  We also 
presented evidence in Figures 4 and 5 of strong geographic clustering of these incentives, both in 
terms of their distribution in 2004 and in terms of how they have changed over time.   
  As mentioned in the introduction, there has been substantial debate in recent years 
concerning both the in-state and out-of-state effects of state investment tax incentives on   17
economic activity.  State policymakers, national policymakers, and the U.S. judiciary all have 
shown a need for careful empirical assessment of these effects.  The collection, construction, and 
analysis of data on state investment tax policy discussed in this paper is a necessary prerequisite 
to such an assessment. 
  Our ongoing research combines the data described in this paper with state-level data on 
manufacturing activity and begins to evaluate the effects of state investment tax incentives on 
activity within and outside of the state (Chirinko and Wilson, 2006).  In subsequent work, we   
plan to more formally evaluate the whether states are engaged in tax competition with one 
another.  While the evidence of geographic clustering of state ITCs and state investment tax 
incentives more broadly is certainly suggestive of tax competition among neighboring states, one 
must be cautious in jumping to such a conclusion.  An equally plausible alternative explains 
clustering  by state economic shocks that are correlated within regions.  Under this interpretation, 
clustering simply reflects that states in a region, each acting without regard to other states’ 
policies, enact similar policies in reaction to similar economic shocks.  Such an evaluation calls 
out for formal probit analyses and a sophisticated set of explanatory variables drawing on both 
economic and political forces (e.g.,  those described in Markusen (2006, NTA proceedings)). 
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Notes:  Counted investment tax credits (ITCs) include only general, statewide ITCs.  Excluded are ITCs targetted at specific 
geographic zones ("Enterprise" zones), specific industries, or specific companies.
Data Source:  Authors' calculations based on state corporate tax forms.
Effective Credit Rate (line)  Number of States with Tax Credit (Bars)
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Corporate Income Tax Rate (Top Marginal) (right axis)
Investment Tax Credit Rate (left axis)
*TAXs,t - 1, where TAXs,t is defined in eqn. (2) in the text.  21
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